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A blueprint for obtaining judicial notice
of a fact that need not be proven at trial
By Professor Cynthia Ford
June 2016 marks the 140th anniversary of the Battle of the
Little Bighorn. It is thus fitting to continue our exploration of
the doctrine of judicial notice by reference to several "facts"
about the Battle:
0 George Armstrong Custer was killed in the Battle of the
Little Bighorn;
0 The Battle of the Little Bighorn occurred on June 25-26,
1876;
0 Custer "died for our sins."
If there were a modern trial in a Montana state court where
these three facts were relevant, and it was your job to prove
them, could you use judicial notice as a shortcut? As we will see
below, the answer to that question is different for each of these
three statements, because M.R.E. 201 (Judicial Notice of Fact)
applies differently to each.
Last month, I discussed in some detail the types of facts
which the Montana Supreme Court has held to be and not to be
suitable for judicial notice. I also compared the Montana and
federal versions of Article II of the Rules of Evidence, which dif-
fer significantly. Here, I will deal with the exact procedure for
obtaining/opposing judicial notice of fact under the two arms of
M.R.E. 201, and the effect of a court's ruling granting' judicial
notice.
FIRST: HOW NOT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
Before M.R.E. 201 was effective, the Montana Supreme
Court analyzed a Worker's Compensation Proceeding in which
the judge below took judicial notice of the contents of the
claimant's medical file. Relying on F.R.E. 201, the Court ob-
served that the federal rule allowed judicial notice of adjudica-
tive facts only (a distinction eliminated in the 1978 M.R.E.) but
did not expressly find whether or not the letters in the file from
doctors who did not testify were adjudicative or not. Instead,
the Court zeroed in on the need for indisputability before judi-
cial notice can be taken. The Court's holding still applies today:
Disputed medical conclusions by doctors
contained in medical reports cannot be judicially
noticed. It should be remembered judicial notice
is intended to save time and expense by not
requiring formal proof for Undisputed facts.
Judicial notice cannot supply evidence in the
form of unsworn hearsay testimony in letters,
absent agreement of the parties. (Emphasis
added).
1 The effect of a denial of a request for judicial notice is simple: you have to prove
the fact at trial, using witnesses and/or exhibits to do so, according to the M.R.E.
Hert v. J. J. Newberry Co., 178 Mont. 355, 365, 584 P.2d 656,
662 (1978)2.
This case, and warning, illustrate a common problem:
lawyers who use judicial notice inappropriately to fill in gaps in
their cases. In the Hert case, for example, the defense appears
to have assumed its letters would get in without objection, not
realizing that they were outright hearsay (or thinking opposing
counsel would not know the hearsay rule?). When the plaintiff
did in fact object, defense counsel tried a Hail Mary, invoking
judicial notice. The pass went through at trial, but the review
team in Helena reversed the victory. The only way to admit the
doctors' opinions as to the claimant's prognosis is through live
(or deposition) testimony, subject to cross-examination under
oath, which of course is the whole point of the hearsay rule.
Opinion testimony is by its very nature not "indisputable" as
required by Rule 201, so is not properly judicially noticeable.
Improper judicial notice cannot trump Rule 802.
GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR AVOIDING THE NEED
TO PROVE A FACT AT TRIAL
At the very beginning of your case, you should begin a
blueprint of the evidence you will need to adduce at trial, and
continue to refine it as you prepare for trial. (I will spend a
whole column on this blueprint approach this fall). Once you
identify the applicable law, it will provide the elements you need
to prove to prevail on your claim or defense. Then, under each
element, you list the facts which show this element is met, and
how you will prove each fact. There are three, and only three,
options for proof of a fact at trial:
1. Witness testimony;
2. Exhibit(s);
3. Judicial notice.
When a fact on your list is "not subject to reasonable dispute
in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial ju-
risdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned," Rule 201, you should pursue the third
method of proof, judicial notice.
As with most things evidentiary, the best first step is to call
your adversary and ask for a stipulation before you go to the
2 Hert's holding about the non-admissibility of letters from doctors was changed
administratively, for Workers'Compensation proceedings only, in 1990 by the
adoption of Rule 24.5.317, ARM. Miller v. Frasure, 264 Mont. 354, 365, 871 P.2d
1302,1308 (1994).
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trouble of a motion for judicial notice.3 If the fact truly is indis-
putable, by definition your adversary would be unreasonable to
refuse to stipulate to it. M.R.Civ.P. 16, "Pretrial Conferences,"
explicitly encourages parties to agree to facts in order to stream-
line trials:
(2) Matters for Consideration. At any pretrial
conference, the court may consider and take
appropriate action on the following matters: ...
(C) obtaining admissions and stipulations
about facts and documents to avoid unnecessary
proof, ...
(D) avoiding unnecessary proof ...
(My trusty source in the Ravalli County Attorney's Office
tells me that criminal trials usually also have a pretrial confer-
ence and stipulated facts, even though I was unable to find
quickly any specific statewide rule on this aspect of criminal
procedure, as to which my ignorance is boundless). Proposing
agreement as to a clear fact is a win/win for you. If your op-
ponent unreasonably refuses to agree, you can mention that in
your motion for judicial notice and at the pretrial conference
and at least get credit for trying to simplify the trial. If your op-
ponent does agree to the fact, you simply insert the fact into the
pretrial order section4 entitled "Admitted Facts" and remove
the task of proving it from your list. Then, you include the
admitted fact in your proposed jury instructions, and "Viola!"
as one of my former students used to say.
HOW TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE IF NO STIPULATION
If your adversary refuses to stipulate to a fact you think
meets the criteria of Rule 201, you should file a motion in limi-
ne identifying the exact fact and asking the court to take judicial
notice of it. The procedure is the same as for all other motions,
requiring you to support the motion with a brief addressing the
legal criteria for judicial notice, starting with M.R.E. 201, and
how your request meets it. You must include with your request
the information necessary for the court to conclude that the fact
is indisputable, because it is either "(1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or "(2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." M.R.E. 201(b).
Under M.R.E. 104, the information you submit to demonstrate
indisputability need not itself be admissible at trial.
Let's take these one at a time. "Generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court," as to Montana's dis-
trict courts, could mean either the judicial district or the state.
Although I could not find any Montana cases on point, M.C.A.
3-5-312. "Jurisdiction of judges coextensive with the state,"
provides that "The jurisdiction of the judges of the district
courts of the state of Montana in... shall be coextensive with the
boundaries of the state of Montana as to all matters presented
3 Note that in civil cases, per M.R.Civ.P. 36, you can formally request the admis-
sion of any fact, whether it would qualify for judicial notice or not and, under
Rule 37(c)(2), obtain the fees and expenses of proof for an unreasonable failure to
admit.)
4 Montana Uniform District Court Rule 5 establishes the form for the Pretrial
Order in contested civil cases, which includes at the very beginning a section
entitled "AGREED FACTS:The following facts are admitted, agreed to be true, and
require no proof: (Here enumerate all agreed facts, including facts admitted in the
pleadings.).
to or heard by them and of which they have jurisdiction." Thus,
I read Rule 201 to mean something like "everyone in Montana
knows that ... "
Everyone in Montana (if not the U.S.) for sure knows that
"George Armstrong Custer was killed at the Battle of the Little
Big Horn." This fact is "generally known" within Montana,
and is indisputable. A party might be able to prove the fact at
trial, but would waste substantial resource in doing so. This is a
prime example of a fact eligible for judicial notice.
The Montana Evidence Commission (MEC) comment to the
"generally known" subdivision of M.R.E. 201(b)(1) states:
Facts to be judicially noticed under subdivision
(b)(1) which are "generally known" have been
judicially noticed in many cases in Montana using
slightly different terminology that [than?] these
facts are "common knowledge". See State ex rel.
Schultz-Lindsay v. Board of Equalization, 145
Mont. 380, 401, 403 P2d 635 (1965) and Clark v.
Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, 380, 406 P2d 822 (1965)
for recent examples.
In the Schultz-Lindsay case cited by the MEC, the plaintiff
challenged a state statute imposing a license fee on nonresident
contractors, calculated by a percentage of the contractors' gross
receipts. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court did not use the phrase "judicial notice" per se, but as part
of its opinion stated baldly:
It is a matter of common knowledge that there is
a vast difference between profit and gross receipts.
In the instance of profit all expenses have been
paid, and it is net to the recipient; as to gross
receipts nothing has been paid for expenses and
there may be no profit. (Emphasis added).
145 Mont. at 401.
Clark v. Worrall, the other case cited with approval by the
MEC, was a slip-and-fall case arising at a bowling alley. The
plaintiff alleged that floor beneath her seat was wet from spilled
beverages, and that a piece of cellophane on that wet floor
should have been cleaned up. She also claimed negligence
in the failure of the bowling alley to warn her that floors are
slippery when wet and/or covered with debris. The court ac-
cepted the defense view of the law, that "there is no obligation
to protect the invitee against dangers which are known to her,
or which are so apparent that she may reasonably be expected
to discover them and be able to look out for herself." The court
then went on to observe:
... it is a matter of common knowledge that a tile
floor will be slippery when wet.... Concerning (3),
we feel that the folding nature of chairs such as
these, customarily found in auditoriums, etc., is so
readily apparent that the plaintiff could reasonably
be expected to recognize it. (Emphasis added).
Notice, next page
5 It does not appear that either party asked for judicial notice of the definitions of
"profit" v. "gross receipts;" under the current version of M.R.E. 201(c), "[a] court may
take judicial notice, whether requested or not.'
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Clark v. Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, 380-81, 406 P.2d 822, 825
(1965).
That "everyone knows" that Custer was killed at the Little
Big Horn could be proven by submitting with the motion for
judicial notice the results of a poll of Montanans, showing that
most said they knew the fact. Obviously, though, acquiring this
information would be expensive and time-consuming, exactly
the opposite of the purpose of the doctrine of judicial notice.
The cases cited by the Commission indicate that such proof
would be unnecessary; it suffices to argue that the fact "is a mat-
ter of common knowledge."
There is a caveat: the requisite degree of knowledge is
"general" in the jurisdiction. The judge's personal knowledge
or opinion is not enough. In Rose v. Myers, 223 Mont. 13, 724
P.2d 176 (1986), an agister foreclosed on the statutory lien for
keeping and feeding horses. Fifty-five horses were sold at auc-
tion and the proceeds applied to the amount due for the care
and feeding of the horses. In her Order after trial, Judge Barz
stated:
The Court takes notice of two factors. The Court
takes judicial notice that the sum of $12 per head
per month cannot possibly include the cost of
providing extra feed for the horses. The Court
further notes that the Plaintiffs have shown
knowledge of this fact by making $7,000 payment
to the Defendant prior to March, 1985. (114 head
X $12 per month X 8 months = $1,824) The
Court takes note of this, not to rule on the merits
of the contract dispute, but rather as a factor in
the notice Plaintiffs had regarding the sale.
223 Mont. at 19. The horse owners appealed. The Supreme
Court held that the judicial notice was (harmless) error:
"Appellants are correct when they say the court incorrectly cal-
culated the bill and took judicial notice of a fact not appropriate
for judicial notice." Unfortunately, the Court did not explain
its conclusion other than to recite the provisions of Rule 201,
simply going on to observe there was other testimony to the
same effect as the facts the court judicially noticed, so the error
was wrong.
The alternative ground to finding a fact to be indisputable
under M.R.E. 201 is that it is "capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned." In another case decided before M.R.E.
201 became effective, the defendants were convicted of sell-
ing "intoxicating liquor" to a 15-year-old boy. The drink in
question was a "vodka and squirt." (Oh, to be 15...) On appeal,
the defendants argued that the judge improperly instructed
the jury that: "Vodka squirt and Vodka Collins as used in the
testimony in this case are intoxicating liquors." The Supreme
Court upheld this instruction (and the convictions), citing the
statutory precursor to M.R.E. 201 and citing several extrajudi-
cial authorities:
Vodka is a well-recognized potent intoxicating
liquor. It possesses much power and authority.
Even when mixed with squirt it continues to
pack somewhat of a wallop. Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2d ed., defines 'vodka'
as, 'A Russian distilled alcoholic liquor commonly
made from rye, sometimes from potatoes, and
rarely from barley. Sometimes, in Russia, any kind
of whisky, brandy, etc.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary defines
'vodka' as, 'A distilled spirituous liquor, usually
made from rye, sometimes from barley or
potatoes; also, any spirituous liquor, as brandy,
gin, etc.' And the same authority defines
'spirituous' as, 'Containing alcohol; especially,
containing a large percentage of alcohol.' Funk
& Wagnalls New Standard Encyclopedia, Vol.
24, p. 405, in defining 'vodka' said: 'Russian
brandy, a strong spirituous beverage * * * Vodka
as manufactured contains about 90 per cent of
alcohol, but is diluted to 60 and 40.'
As heretofore shown, R.C.M.1947, § 94-35-107,
makes any beverage containing one-half of one per
centurn or more of alcohol, an intoxicating liquor.
Under R.C.M.1947, § 93-501-1, the court may
take judicial notice of the commonly accepted
and generally understood definitions of the word
'vodka'...
State v. Wild, 130 Mont. 476, 492, 305 P.2d 325, 334 (1956).6
This fact, that vodka is intoxicating, might have fit under
the "matter of common knowledge" branch of Rule 201, but
providing such authorities as the two dictionaries here for sure
meets the "resort to sources" of undeniable authority.
The second fact in our Little Bighorn example is that the
battle was fought on June 25-26, 1876. Although most, if not
all, Montanans know that Custer died at the Little Big Horn, I
myself always have to look up the exact date of the battle and I
expect that is true of most other normal Montanans.7 If I had to
prove the date at trial, I could call an expert historian (because
there are no living survivors who could testify from their
personal knowledge per Rule 602). It would be cheaper and
easier to simply ask the court to take judicial notice of the fact
that "the Battle of the Little Big Horn was fought on June 25-26,
1876." Because this fact is not "generally known," I would have
to use the other half of Rule 20 1(a), and this time, as in the Wild
case discussed above, submit to the court "sources whose ac-
curacy cannot reasonably be questioned."
In the olden days (such as when I began practice), I would
have presented the Encyclopedia Britannica or some similar
tome to the court as a clearly accurate source. I probably would
have had to go to the local public library to find the volume,
or consulted with a local history professor to locate the most
6 It is not clear whether the judge below took judicial notice that vodka is in-
toxicating, or whether the Supreme Court itself took judicial notice of that fact on
appeal, as part of its analysis of the contested jury instruction. It is clearly the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court that vodka "even when mixed with squirt.. .continues
to pack somewhat of a wallop'
7 It is my own cross to bear that my stellar husband has a master's degree in
Western American History and actually does remember every single significant
date of events like this.
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authoritative historical source. Today, from my home office
computer, I googled "Battle of the Little Bighorn." In 1.01 sec-
onds, my search yielded "about 810,000 results." In order, the
first 5 results were:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Battle-of theLittleBighorn
* www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/
battle-of-the-little-bighorn
* www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/custer.htm
* https://www.nps.gov/libi/learn/.../battle-of-the-little-
bighorn.htm
* www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn
That most people use Wikipedia occasionally is a "matter of
common knowledge" and thus probably makes that fact itself
judicially noticeable without resort to any source. However,
without doing much research, I am confident that Wikipedia
is not an appropriate basis for judicial notice (or any other
courtroom use), precisely because its accuracy is very open to
question:
Over three hundred federal judicial opinions
have cited Wikipedia as a source. Most opinions
cite Wikipedia in footnotes to define terms used
in the opinion. Some judges, however, like the
BIA in the Badasa case, have used Wikipedia as
a source on which to base decisions. Judicial use
of Wikipedia as a source of evidence or a basis for
making decisions is a serious problem, because
the nature of Wikipedia undermines the common
law system. Wikipedia is an online encyclopedia
that contains articles that anyone can create, alter,
or revise. Additionally, Wikipedia is not only
merely a secondary source, but the articles are
subject to change on a daily, sometimes hourly,
basis. For these and other reasons this comment
will explore, federal judicial opinions should not
cite Wikipedia. Wikipedia may be a starting point
for research, but this comment will discuss many
of the reasons why federal judges and members
of the federal bar should not cite Wikipedia as
a source. Additionally, Wikipedia's reliability is
questionable at best, and for this reason alone
Wikipedia should not be cited as an authoritative
source on any topic. (Footnotes omitted)
Amber Lynn Wagner, "Wikipedia Made Law? The Federal
Judicial Citation of Wikipedia," 26 J. Marshall J. Computer &
Info. L. 229, 231 (2008).
However, although they are online sources, the non-Wiki-
pedia entries appear to be much more reliable, particularly the
fourth listing, maintained by the National Park Service. Most
importantly, all five of these sources (including Wikipedia)
give the same dates for the battle: June 25-26, 1876. Taken
together, they are "sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned" and they establish the indisputability of the fact
that "the Battle of the Little Bighorn was fought on June 25-26,
1876." In support of my motion for judicial notice of this fact,
I would submit an affidavit detailing my Internet search and its
results, and attach as exhibits thereto the printouts of the face
sheet of my search and of each of the first five results. (I would
include the Wikipedia entry for completeness, but I would place
it last in the pile.) I expect the judge will grant judicial notice
of this fact under the second half of Rule 20 1(b). With this
method, I have saved my client all time, energy, and money I
would have needed to prove this date at trial through an expert
historian.
That leaves the last "fact": "Custer died for your sins." This
is drawn from the title of a book published in 1969 by Vine
Deloria, Jr.; its subtitle is "An Indian Manifesto." Again using
the amazing Internet, I found that Amazon sells the book in
hardcover, paperback, and "board book" formats. Besides
the book itself, I found another Wikipedia entry about it, and
numerous "study guides." The book is clearly influential and
widely read, 11 years after its author died. However, wide dis-
tribution does not satisfy Rule 201(b)'s standard for indisput-
able fact-the very subtitle "manifesto" disqualifies its premise
from judicial notice. Merriam Webster Dictionary, cited as
an unquestionably accurate source in the vodka case (State
v. Wild) discussed above, defines "manifesto" as "a written
statement declaring publicly the intentions, motives, or views
of its issuer." Thus, the book simply promotes the author's
opinion that "Custer died for y/our sins" rather than establishes
an incontrovertible fact. Just as the Montana Supreme Court
observed in the Hert case discussed at the beginning of this
column, under "How Not to Take Judicial Notice:" "Disputed
... conclusions by [authors] contained in [books] cannot be
judicially noticed."
Therefore, I cannot establish that "Custer died for your sins"
via judicial notice. No judge in the land would grant such a
motion because it is a controversial opinion, not an indisput-
able fact. I still can get this contention before the jury, but
without the imprimatur of the court's finding that it is a true
fact. I would have to call an expert to give this opinion, assum-
ing it is relevant to a claim or defense in the fictional case. The
expert will have to meet the requirements of expertise in her/
his field, helpfulness of that field to the jury, and reliability of
the underlying methodology. If the judge as gatekeeper allows
this testimony, the opponent is entitled to put on controvert-
ing evidence, most likely from another expert with similar
qualifications and a different conclusion. The jury will have to
weigh this competing testimony and credit one over the other
in reaching its verdict. This is what trial is meant to do, and it is
the default whenever judicial notice is questionable.
The scorecard on the three "facts" presented at the begin-
ning of this column is 2 out of three, not bad. The issue now is
what effect the judicial notice of the first two facts is on the jury.
The answer to that question depends on whether the case is civil
or criminal.
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL V. CRIMINAL
Obtaining judicial notice of a fact under Rule 201 is a vic-
tory, but it means nothing unless you convert that pretrial vic-
tory into capital at trial. The way to ensure that the jury knows
it can consider the fact as established, even though no proof was
adduced at trial, is through an instruction from the judge to the
Notice, next page
8 The online version of the dictionary, found at http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/manifesto.
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jury. You may want to ask the judge to give the judicial notice
instruction at the beginning of the trial, so the jury will have the
fact in mind as the rest of the evidence is received. For sure,
you want to include the judicial notice instruction as part of
your proposed final instructions, so that the jury will remember
it as they deliberate.
The Montana Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 2d9, Instruction
1.10, confusingly entitled "Judicial Notice (Agreed Facts 0 )"
states:
A court may take "judicial notice" of some facts,
and if it does, no evidence is required to prove
them. In this case, the court has taken judicial
notice of the fact that ...
The Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, helpfully, are posted
online for free by the Montana Attorney General's Office."
However, free or not, I could not find any criminal corollary
in the Criminal Pattern Instructions on the subject of judicial
notice.
Notice that the proposed civil instruction does not tell the ju-
rors whether or not they are bound by the judicially noticed fact.
This is a big deal, and should be clarified in the pattern instruc-
tion. Rule 201(g) provides different effects of this instruction for
civil and criminal cases:
(g) Instructing the jury. In a civil action or
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the
jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
The Montana 201(g) is substantially the same as F.R.E.
201(f). The Montana Evidence Commission recognized that this
difference between the effect of judicial notice in civil and crimi-
nal cases was not part of Montana law prior to the adoption of
the M.R.E. The MEC consciously chose to follow the federal
version of the rule, and thus this difference:
The Commission feels that there is no strong
reason to ignore the civil-criminal distinction of
the Federal Rule while there are these reasons to
adopt it: first, it will be uniform with the Federal
Rule, and second, it insures that all facts necessary
to prove each element of a crime will be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, not dictated to be
9 The Civil Pattern Instructions are not available anywhere online, and even in
this age where Amazon provides all things, can be purchased only through the
State Bar of Montana. (Amazon lists the Montana Civil Pattern Instructions as"cur-
rently unavailable') I was able to get this language without paying an inordinate
sum by simply calling the Jameson Law Library at the ABIII School of Law in Mis-
soula. As always, Library Director Stacey Gordon graciously found the instruction,
scanned it and emailed it to me.
10 Although the Pattern Instruction does not actually cover"agreed facts" as to
which judicial notice is not required, a minor alteration to the preface should suf-
fice:"The parties may agree that some facts are true, and if the parties so agree, no
evidence is required to prove those facts. In this case, the parties have agreed that
the following facts are true:..."
found through judicial notice in instructing the
jury. This view is consistent with the reason for
Congressional changes in this subdivision to its
present form because mandatory instructions in
criminal cases are "contrary to the spirit of the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial".
Shortly after the M.R.E. became effective, the Supreme Court
noted with approval a criminal jury instruction given by the trial
court in accordance with Rule 20 1(g). The defendant was con-
victed of theft by accountability, and part of the evidence before
the jury consisted of the trial judge's judicial notice of pleadings
charging the two principals with theft. The Supreme Court held:
We can find no error in the District Court's
decision to take judicial notice of the fact of the
pleadings against Harris and Gunsch, especially in
light of the court's instruction on judicial notice.
We consider initially just what was judicially
noticed the charges against Harris and Gunsch.
The fact of the charges against these women was
not "subject to reasonable dispute" and, moreover,
the fact of the charges was capable of "accurate
and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned"
namely, the District Court files which contained
the original copies of the charges against the two
principals. It is important to note that we are
discussing the fact of the charges here and not
their validity.
Even if the taking of judicial notice in any way
tainted the fairness of defendant's trial, any taint
would be eliminated by the instruction given
to the jury. The District Court instructed the
jury that it was allowed to accept as conclusive
any fact judicially noticed but that it was not
required to do so. See Rule 20 1(g), Mont.R.Evid.
Having drawn the jury's attention to the pleadings
which had been judicially noticed, the court made
it clear that the court's decision was not binding
on the jury and that they could disregard the fact
of the pleadings against Harris and Gunsch. It was
then the jury's prerogative to accept or reject the
judicially noticed facts as evidence, and we will not
disturb its decision. State v. McKenzie, supra; State
v. Stoddard (1966), 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827.
State v. Hart, 191 Mont. 375, 388-89, 625 P.2d 21, 29 (1981)
(Emphasis added). The Court later cited Hart with approval:
Finally, this Court has ruled that taking judicial
notice of proceedings against a codefendant does
not taint the fairness of the defendant's trial if the
court instructs the jury that it has the prerogative
to accept or reject the judicially-noticed facts as
evidence. State v. Hart (1981), 191 Mont. 375,
389, 625 P.2d 21, 29, cert. denied, (1981) 454 U.S.
827, 102 S.Ct. 119, 70 L.Ed.2d 102. The jury was so
instructed at Oatman's trial.
11 https://dojmt.gov/agooffice/criminal-jury-instructions/ Notice, page 33
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State v. Oatman, 275 Mont. 139, 145, 911 P.2d 213, 217
(1996).
Neither Hart nor Oatman set out the exact language of the
jury instructions approved by the Supreme Court as to the ef-
fect of the judicial notice in those criminal cases. However, the
paraphrases by the Court support the inference that the judges
gave instructions which were drawn directly from the language
of Rule 20 1(g). Helpfully, because of the similarity between the
M.R.E. and the F.R.E. 201 provisions on this point, the Ninth
Circuit has online Model Criminal Jury Instructions 2 which
directly address judicial notice, last updated in March 2016:
2.5 JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court has decided it is not necessary to receive
evidence of the fact that [insert fact noticed e.g.,
the city of San Francisco is north of the city of Los
Angeles] [because this fact is of such common
knowledge]. You may, but are not required to,
accept this fact as true.
The comment to this model instruction is also helpful, citing
both F.R.E. 201(g) and United States v. Chapel, 41 F.3d 1338
(9th Cir.1994). Finally, note that the Ninth Circuit Criminal
Model Jury Instructions also include an instruction (2.4)
on stipulations of fact, which in marked contrast to judicial
notice are binding on the jury. 3 In light of the comprehensive
analysis of the Ninth Circuit Model Instructions and the lack
of a Montana Criminal Pattern Instruction on judicial notice,
I recommend that criminal lawyers adopt the Ninth Circuit
model for Montana state cases. I also recommend that a judi-
cial notice instruction identical to the Ninth Circuit Model be
added to the Montana Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.
On the civil side, although there is a Montana Pattern
Instruction on judicial notice, discussed above, it does not
give the jury any guidance as to what to do with the judicially
noticed fact. Again, the combination of the clear language of
12 http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/423
13 "2.4 STIPULATIONS OF FACT
The parties have agreed to certain facts that have been stated to you. You should
therefore treat these facts as having been proved:'
Comment
"Stipulations freely and voluntarily entered into in criminal trials are as binding
and enforceable as those entered into in civil actions' United States v. Gwaltney,
790 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir.1 986). "When parties have entered into stipulations
as to material facts, those facts will be deemed to have been conclusively estab-
lished" United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 107 (9th Cir.1 976) (citations omit-
ted). "[W]hen a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court
in the presence of the defendant, and is agreed to by defendant's acknowledged
counsel, the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is aware of the
content of the stipulation and agrees to it through his or her attorney. Unless a
criminal defendant indicates objection at the time the stipulation is made, he or
she is ordinarily bound by such stipulation: United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d
832, 836 (9th Cir.1 980). In any event, a trial judge need not make as probing an in-
quiry as is required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when considering whether a defendant's
factual stipulation is knowing and voluntary. United States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256,
1263-64 (9th Cir.1 978). See also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,186 (1997)
(acceptance of a stipulation regarding prior conviction may be appropriate even
where government objects under Fed. R. Evid. 403); JURY INSTRUCTIONS COM-
MITTEE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, A MANUAL ON JURY TRIAL PROCEDURES § 1.1.B
(2013).
M.R.E. 201(g), its similarity to F.R.E. 201(f) on the same issue,
and the fact that the Ninth Circuit does have model language
argues for use of the Ninth Circuit language on the conclusive-
ness of judicial notice in a civil case. In fact, the Ninth Circuit
Civil Model Jury Instructions 4 set the stage for judicial notice
(and agreed facts) in the preliminary instructions:
1.6 WHAT IS EVIDENCE
The evidence you are to consider in deciding what
the facts are consists of:
1. the sworn testimony of any witness;
2. the exhibits that are admitted into evidence;
3. any facts to which the lawyers have agreed; and
4. any facts that I [may instruct] [have instructed]
you to accept as proved.
The specific model for judicial notice, with its accompanying
comment, provides:
2.3 JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court has decided to accept as proved the fact
that [state fact]. You must accept this fact as true.
Comment
An instruction regarding judicial notice should
be given at the time notice is taken. In a civil case,
the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the judge to
determine that a fact is sufficiently undisputed to
be judicially noticed and requires that the jury be
instructed that it is required to accept that fact.
Fed. R. Evid. 201(f). In a criminal case, however,
the court must instruct the jury that it may or
may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive. Id.;
see United States v. Chapel, 41 F.3d 1338, 1342
(9th Cir.1994) (in a criminal case, "the trial court
must instruct 'the jury that it may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed"'); Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury
Instruction 2.5 (2010) (Judicial Notice).
A Montana lawyer in state court on a civil case should use
the MPI 1.10 (discussed above), but add to it the sentence rec-
ommended by the Ninth Circuit: "You must accept this fact as
true." A more global fix would be for the Montana Civil Pattern
Instructions to add this same sentence to its Instruction 1.10.
CONCLUSION
It is indisputable that this Evidence Corner article has
dragged on far too long. Although there are several other in-
teresting subtopics about judicial notice under the M.R.E., as a
matter of common knowledge, it is time to stop for this month.
I hope to conclude judicial notice in the next issue of the
Montana Lawyer. In the meantime, be sure to take a moment
June 25 to remember those who died on the battlefield in 1876.
Cynthia Ford teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and
Remedies. She coached the Trial Team for 20 years, and regularly
serves on the faculty of the Advanced Trial School at the School of
Law.
14 http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/50
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